State. It must be prepared to defend its own information and infrastructure; to support other government agencies in their defense, enforcement, and consequence management functions;
One of the biggest threats facing the United States in the 21
st century is that of a cyber attack. The attack could be launched against military or civilian targets, and could zero in on critical information or the information systems which support critical infrastructures. Due to the quantity, complexity, and the diverse ownership of the information systems and critical infrastructures in this country, no single governmental or private agency can single-handedly provide an adequate defense. As a result, the nation's information assurance (IA) effort requires interagency and private sector cooperation.
The United States has begun to take this threat seriously and to organize for the protection of its national information and infrastructure. However, the organizations set up to perform the mission, including the military, are numerous; leadership and direction is fragmented; and the structure is too cumbersome to respond quickly to an attack.
A streamlined interagency protection organization, coupled with a national awareness and education program, is required to deal with the information threat facing the nation.
WHAT IS THE INFORMATION THREAT AND WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT IT?
The nation's military and civilian information and information systems are at risk of being corrupted, disrupted, compromised, or destroyed. National security secrets and corporation proprietary information could be stolen, command and control of the nation's military could be disrupted, and the nation's critical infrastructure could be disabled by a successful cyber attack.
The consequences of such attacks would be catastrophic. Swiss research has determined that a complete computer breakdown would kill a nation's banking activities after two days, its commerce in two and a half days, and its factories in five days. 1 And attacks are currently occurring at some level every day. The U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), only one of over 20 incident reporting centers, states that it receives 45-60 incident reports each day from the private sector. In 1999 the annual number of incidents exceeded 9,000. 2 Those numbers are likely just the tip of the iceberg. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) found that when it evaluated, i.e., attacked, unclassified defense systems, only one in twenty victims knew they were attacked, and of those, only one in twenty reported it, meaning that only somewhere around one in 400 attacks were actually reported. 3 A large number of attacks are directed at the Department of Defense (DoD). DISA estimated that as many as 250,000 attacks may have occurred in 1995. 4 In 1998, three teenagers were able to break into DoD systems carrying information on cargo shipments, payroll accounts, health records and a host of other administrative, logistics, and personnel matters. Pentagon officials were worried that the hackers could disrupt military operations at a time when the U.S.
was building up its force for operations in the Persian Gulf. 5 Adding to the concern, at least ten foreign countries are developing information warfare and electronic intrusion techniques. 6 
NATURE OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS
The definition of information operations (IO) used by the American military is found in the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information
Operations. This publication states that "information operations involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems." A subset of information operations, defensive information operations "integrate and coordinate policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend information and information systems." 7 Offensive information operations can be a lucrative weapon. It has several advantages: it can minimize collateral physical damage; it can minimize friendly losses of personnel and equipment; it can help avoid escalation; and it's relatively cheap. 8 Yet the focus of information operations for the United States is likely to be on defensive operations. That's because the U.S., with its growing dependence on information systems and its dominance in the world's technology market, is more vulnerable to an IO attack than are other nations. North America has 44 percent of the world's technology market; 9 while on the other hand, only 20 percent of the world may be significantly influenced by the information revolution. 10 In fact, one of the reasons the U.S. didn't use much of its offensive information operations capabilities in Serbia in the spring of 1999, according to the Washington Post, was due to the "rudimentary or decentralized nature of some Yugoslav systems, which officials said did not lend themselves to computer assault."
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Defensive information operations are fought on several fronts, reflecting the wide range of operations included in the information domain. Joint Pub 3-13 highlights the elements of defensive information operations as being information assurance, operations security (OPSEC), physical security, counterdeception, counterpropaganda, counterintelligence, electronic warfare (EW), and special information operations (SIO). 12 This paper will focus on the cyber aspects of information operations, with the primary attention on information assurance. Information assurance is defined as operations "that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities." 13 WHAT'S AT RISK?
The impact of cyber operations goes beyond the information systems attacked. Cyber operations also reach the infrastructure dependent on information systems, such as military weapon systems and commercial power and water systems.
Specifically, military targets of cyber operations may include DoD sensitive, classified, or administrative information for purposes of stealing technology, of learning strategic, operational, or tactical plans, or of influencing perception and will; computers in order to disrupt operations or corrupt information important to operations; weapons systems to disorient or disable those with embedded information systems or dependent on information for correct operations (e.g., targeting systems or precision guided munitions); and communications networks in order to deny or disrupt command and control of government and military forces, or to deny or disrupt administrative and logistical support to the military. In short, a military as highly dependent on information as is this country's is extremely vulnerable to attacks on that information or on its processing and delivery.
Just as vulnerable is the nation's commercial and governmental infrastructure.
Disruptions in our telecommunications networks, energy and water infrastructures, transportation systems, banking and financial computers and networks, emergency services and public media would be crippling. Business transactions would halt, people and goods could not be transported, the economy would stumble, and the media could lose credibility or the ability to get its message across. The effects on the public would be devastating. Essential and emergency services would be at risk, and the confidence and will of the American public could be quickly damaged if but one of the above information-dependent segments was successfully attacked.
WHY WE'RE AT RISK
We have become a nation dependent on information and information systems across the range of civilian and military processes. Our formerly disparate infrastructures have not only become increasingly automated, but increasingly interlinked as well. 14 A flare in one part of the nerve system can cause muscle movements throughout the body.
And we're not just marginally interconnected. The U.S. is the world's most advanced and most dependent user of information technology. We have one-half of the world's computer capacity and more than 60% of the world's Internet assets. 15 That makes us economically powerful, but it also makes us the largest and most vulnerable target around. 
TYPES OF INFORMATION THREATS
The kinds of threats that defensive information operations must protect against include:
• Destruction of information -for example, the erasure of a database important to decision making or operations. This could include a company's database of customers or the plans of a military operation.
• Corruption of information -for example, information that has been altered to implant false data that results in bad decisions or prevents smooth operations.
• Unauthorized information -this could include release of sensitive economic or political information, or could be false information misattributed to an authorized person.
• Misinformation or propaganda -release of false information, primarily to the public media, with the intent of influencing national opinion or will.
• Lack of communication or denial of service -disrupting or destroying the communications system itself to prevent information flow.
• Espionage -collecting unauthorized information.
• Web page misinformation or defacement -similar to misinformation or propaganda, but using the Internet as the media to destroy credibility, to discredit, or to change the message intended by the owner of the Web page.
• Auto-mechanical failure -using cyber attacks to cripple the operation of machinery or networks critical to operations. This could include shutting down a power grid or disabling warfare equipment that is dependent on automation or telecommunications systems to operate properly. Information assurance begins with the information users, folks who can limit unauthorized access to DoD information by understanding system vulnerability, i.e., becoming educated, and by practicing information security through password controls and physical protection of DoD information assets. The second line of defense is the system administrators who manage an organization's overall information operations on a day-to-day basis. Additional defenders include information system providers who provide the automation and communication assets and services, and information systems developers who design and program the systems and applications. At higher levels, key organizations include the military services' information warfare centers that monitor information assurance, the law enforcement community (both military and civil) who respond to information attacks, and the intelligence shops that provide warning and advice.
HOW WE CAN PROTECT AGAINST INFORMATION ATTACKS
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Other considerations for the military in protecting its information and systems are to rapidly isolate DoD systems during attacks to prevent viruses or other agents from infecting DoD computer and communication systems; increase network diversity to provide robustness and expand the center of gravity; and share information with the private sector to better spot patterns of attack and to assist the NII in protecting itself.
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WHAT THE NATION IS DOING TO COMBAT THE RISK
The nation's overall response is currently centered around Presidential Decision Directive • National Infrastructure Assurance Council. This council is comprised of officials from major infrastructure providers and state and local governments. It meets periodically to strengthen the partnership of the public and private sectors in protecting critical infrastructures. Senior federal government officials participate in the meetings as appropriate.
• Chief Infrastructure Assurance Officer. Appointed by each federal department and agency, the CIAO is responsible for the protection off all aspects of the department's critical infrastructure, less that of information assurance. They perform vulnerability assessments on their departments' computer and physical systems. The information assurance function is assigned to the Chief Information Officer (CIO) of the department or agency. The CIO may be dual hatted as the CIAO if the department deems it appropriate.
• Information Sharing and Analysis Center. A private sector organization to serve as the mechanism for gathering, analyzing, sanitizing and disseminating private sector information to both industry and the NIPC (see paragraph below).
• 
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SYSTEM
Now that a structure is emerging to handle the defense against information attacks, we may believe we have reached the end state, or at least can see it over the horizon. Unfortunately, we are not quite that far along. There are a number of problems which critics have surfaced and which need to be addressed to provide a better level of protection than we've seen to date. One expert has summed up the problems succinctly by declaring that "the challenge in the years ahead of us is organizational, not technological." 26 That's understandable when we consider the number of agencies and agents involved in the federal government's information protection effort. A Washington Post article on counterterrorism reveals there are 40 departments and agencies responsible for responding to terrorist attacks, and quotes the General Accounting Office as believing that counterterrorist programs "remain fragmented because key interagency management functions are conducted by different departments and agencies." 27 The same is true for the overall infrastructure protection program. The GAO concludes in a report on critical infrastructure protection that "trust needs to be established among a broad range of stakeholders, questions on the mechanics of information sharing and coordination need to be resolved, roles and responsibilities need to be clarified, and technical expertise needs to be developed." 28 No one disputes that a networked approach is required. GAO wisely points out that "it is not possible to build an overall, comprehensive picture of activity on the global information infrastructure. Networks themselves are too big, they are growing too quickly, and they are continually being reconfigured and reengineered. As a result, it is essential that strong partnerships be developed between a wide range of stakeholders in order to ensure that the right data are at the right place at the right time." 
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATION'S OVERALL INFORMATION DEFENSE?
Since the federal government has no ownership of the private infrastructure, limited jurisdiction, and fiscally constrained intelligence capabilities, private organizations are largely responsible for their own defense. 31 The organizations established by PDD 63 enumerated above are responsible for assisting and coordinating their efforts. The DoD can also provide support to FEMA in consequence management if requested. Its expertise in communications and computers can be enlisted by other federal agencies, as the FBI has done in setting up its computer forensics laboratory. However, the Posse Comitatus Act currently prevents the DoD from being the lead agent in domestic acts of computer attack which are perceived to be law enforcement issues.
HOW REAL IS THE THREAT?
The information warfare literature reveals there is a considerable range of opinion regarding the imminence and the severity of the information threat. Since our sense of urgency in improving the response to the information threat will undoubtedly be driven by the perceived level of danger, the reality of the threat is a major issue.
SOME ANALYSTS ARGUE THE THREAT IS OVER-STATED
Several analysts downplay our own vulnerability and the ability of potential hostile actors.
One recurring theme is that if the threat is so real, how come we haven't yet seen a severe attack? Another argument is that, yes, there are threats out there, but they are more nuisance than substance, and that an electronic Pearl Harbor is not likely to happen any time soon.
Sound bites from the naysayers at a December 1999 "Information Revolution and National Warfare (IW) theory and technologies and is sharpening its focus on IW. 41 The military relies on sophisticated computer-assisted weaponry and is increasingly orienting itself on a rapid global force-projection strategy. Therefore, the ability to provide timely and accurate information is vital to all aspects of combat operation. 42 That makes information a center of gravity, and the evidence shows that it is at risk. In a military exercise called Eligible Receiver in June of 1997, analysts from the National Security Agency used off-the-shelf computers and widely available hacker programs to demonstrate that they could disrupt computer operations at major military commands and interrupt electrical power and emergency phone service in several U.S. cities. 43 Eight months later three teenagers gained access to DoD computer files carrying sensitive information on cargo shipments, payroll accounts, health records and other administrative, logistical, and personnel material. It took DoD and law enforcement officials almost a month to track down the offenders in a search operation code named Solar Sunrise.
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Other evidence lends support to the belief that the nation is in danger. Computer virus attack damages in 1999 amounted to approximately $7.6 billion, according to Computer Economics, Inc., 45 with much of the damage occurring in the private sector. Militarily, there was a sharp increase in attacks on DoD computer systems following the bombings of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. 46 Internationally, China's cyber attacks against Taiwan in 1999 were probable causes of a nationwide blackout and the crash of many of the nation's banking teller machines. 47 Compounding the threat, computer network attacks are relatively easy to launch, giving almost anyone with the desire the needed ability to execute. The equipment is relatively cheap commercial-off-the-shelf goods, doesn't require a logistics tail, is difficult to detect and locate, and is increasingly easy to use, i.e., the required skills level keeps dropping. 48 Finally, one has to wonder, if the U.S. can mount computer attacks today, is there much hope that our adversaries cannot do the same thing to us tomorrow? Reportedly, AT&T was asked in the 1970s to include "bits and pieces" in the national telephone switch it sold to Poland that would allow it to remotely shut down that country's communications infrastructure. It's also been reported that we developed similar capabilities against North Korean 360/370 military computers. 49 If we were capable of creating those Trojan horses, what makes us think that high technology foreign exporters to us couldn't or wouldn't do the same thing? Since we get much of our commercial chips and software manufactured offshore, we, ourselves, are open to increased vulnerability. 50 And just as the U.S. military boasts of its ability to crack into weapon computer systems, an adversary could do the same thing to us. According to an article in Federal Computer Week, an
Air Force officer sitting in a hotel room in Boston used a laptop computer to hack into a Navy ship at sea and implant false navigation data into the ship's steering system. Gen. John Jumper, Air Combat Command's commander, said, "we should be talking about microchips that manipulate electrons and get into the heart and soul of the SA-10 and SA-12 and tell [the antiaircraft missile system] it's a refrigerator and not a radar. Those things we are capable of doing today." 51 On the down side of this new found capability, a program manager responsible for the Army's Information Assurance Architecture for the Digitized Force said the potential exists for hackers to infiltrate the computer systems used in tanks and other armored vehicles. 52 Unfortunately for us, then, the technology cuts both ways.
Despite the divergence of opinion on the severity of the information threat, one thing appears certain. The more determined and resourced the adversary is, the more our information and critical infrastructures are at risk. We would be highly vulnerable if opposed by a peer information operations competitor in war, or even by a determined and well-resourced terrorist organization.
LEGAL ISSUES OF INFORMATION WARFARE IMPACT A MILITARY RESPONSE
If, as postulated above, the military's role in the interagency process will primarily be that of deterrence and retaliation against attack, there are some major legal issues that must also be considered.
THE DOD GENERAL COUNSEL WEIGHS IN
The United States did not use most of its information warfare arsenal during the conflict in Yugoslavia in the 1990's for three reasons: the untested state of the U.S. cyber arsenal;
Yugoslavia's information technology was not advanced enough to be an effective target; and important to this discussion, nettlesome legal issues. 53 According to the Washington Post, midway through the war with Yugoslavia, the Defense Department's top legal office issued guidelines warning that misuse of cyber attacks could subject U.S. authorities to war crimes • It's difficult to identify the originating attack computer due to such things as the anonymity afforded by traveling through a number of intermediate relay points, using an anonymous bulletin board service, or using a device that generates false origin information.
• It's difficult to identify whether the attacker is an authorized user or has an authorized purpose. That is, once the computer has been located, it is difficult to ascertain whether an authorized user initiated the attack, and if so, whether the attack itself was authorized by the organization employing the user.
• Even if an intrusion is verified as coming from a foreign country, it's difficult to determine whether the attack is state sponsored. And in a globally connected world, an attack can come from anywhere in the world, not just from a computer within the borders of the guilty nation.
• Since an international attack is initially difficult to attribute to a state, it is likely to be treated as an individual attack, and individual attacks are criminal, not military, matters, which should be pursued by the Departments of State and Justice.
The General Counsel's assessment also raises the issue that in times of peace, a computer network attack could be perceived by the UN Security Council as a "threat to peace," or act of war, similar to an armed attack. A U.S. military counterattack to a cyber intrusion, therefore, could be on the same footing as using conventional weapons-an assault on a nation's sovereignty. With possible war crime implications, such a counterattack would likely be used only as a last resort or in self-defense against a major computer attack by a foreign source. amount of collateral damage is foreseeable, unless the foreseeable collateral damage is disproportionate to the military advantage likely to be attained. Accordingly, commanders should make a reasonable effort to discover whether the targeted system is being used for civilian purposes that are essential to public health and safety.
-Indiscriminate Weapons: Related to the concept of minimizing collateral damage, commanders must ensure IO techniques (e.g., malicious logic) are not indiscriminate, i.e., they don't spread to other information systems providing essential services to noncombatants, don't spread to information systems belonging to neutral or friendly nations, and don't release dangerous forces, such as opening dam floodgates, causing oil refinery fires in populated areas, or releasing radioactivity.
CONCLUSION
Although the US military is assigned the mission of defending the nation from attack, when it comes to protecting the nation's critical infrastructure, the Department of Defense is but one of many players, necessitating a robust interagency process and public-private cooperation. The DoD has neither the ability nor the authority to monitor and protect the cyber networks that increasingly drive the nation's critical infrastructure. Therefore the Defense Department must accept and embrace a coordinated, multi-agency response to attacks on the nation's cyber domain.
However, there are glaring seams in coverage between agencies and the public-private sector that remain troubling. There appears to be a lack of unity of command and effort engendered by the nation's highly diversified approach to protection. A large bureaucracy has been established, but no one seems to have the overall picture and no one short of the President has command of the numerous department and agency responses.
As a result, it appears that a number of changes are in order. First is a reorganization of the initial structure set up to provide federal-level protection and coordination. It may be propitious that a new administration is coming to power at the same time that holes in our information protection coverage come to light through recent denial of service attacks and rapidly spread viruses. I'd recommend that the new administration establish unity of effort through the creation of a National Information Protection Director (NIPD) reporting directly to the President to:
• Develop national policy for both peacetime and wartime
• Coordinate Interagency activities by providing distinct lane assignments
• Share threat information better between public and private organizations
• Consolidate the efforts of the intelligence and defense communities
• Oversee a national database of attack patterns and methodologies
• Increase federal support to research and technology
• Inform and educate private infrastructure companies
• Pre-determine military response triggers and responsibilities so that many of the current legal concerns are addressed in advance
• Continue the current initiatives to offer education and higher pay for information assurance specialists
• And perhaps most importantly, plan and exercise repeatedly for a cyber attack response.
PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF AN NIPD
The NIPD would be a federal civilian government agency, organized in two directorates: one for policy and planning and the other for operations. The NIPD director would report directly to the President and would be invited to attend National Security Council and National Economic and organize, direct, and coordinate the efforts of the many agencies required to defend the nation against an information attack.
In summary, the nation's information protection mission is rightfully an interagency concern.
The Department of Defense must work with several federal agencies to help organize the nation's defense, to participate in the nation's protection, and even to provide the offense, or retaliation, that may be required in the case of a severe attack. However, the nation's somewhat fragmented protection structure must be reorganized. DoD's role must be clearer, better planned, and continuously exercised to ensure a swift and sure response to attacks on the nation's information and critical infrastructure.
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